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A Small Step Forward: The ALI  
Domestic Partners Recommendation∗ 
Mark Strasser∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) has recently recommended 
that nonmarital, cohabiting couples should be presumed to have 
taken on certain financial obligations with respect to each other, ab-
sent explicit agreement to the contrary. For example, if the parties 
separate after having been together for a substantial period, one 
partner may be ordered to pay support to the other partner, and 
property acquired during the relationship will be presumed to belong 
to both parties and, thus, will be subject to distribution. In essence, 
the ALI recommendation treats the parties as married with regard to 
their financial obligations to each other but treats the parties as un-
married with regard to third parties’ obligations to them. 
Although the ALI recommendation has a variety of strengths and 
deserves serious consideration, it is likely to generate some contro-
versy. Some commentators are likely to suggest that the proposal 
does not go far enough, since the proposal is “confined to the inter 
se claims of domestic partners”1 and does not provide the basis for 
any claims against any third parties.2 Others are likely to worry that 
adoption of this proposal will adversely affect the traditional under-
standing of family. Those making this latter claim might have two 
very different fears in mind: (1) that this change will induce couples 
who otherwise would have married not to marry, and (2) that this 
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A. Harvard College; M.A., 
Ph.D. University of Chicago; J.D. Stanford Law School. 
 1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) § 6.01 cmt. a [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)]. 
 2. See id. (“Nothing in this Chapter creates claims against any other persons or the 
state.”). 
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change will make nonmarital status too close to marital status and, 
thus, will change the meaning of “marriage” or, perhaps, “family.” 
Neither fear is well-founded, although for very different reasons. 
This Article focuses on (1) why the ALI recommendation will nei-
ther undermine marriage nor the family, and (2) why adoption of 
the ALI recommendation will promote fairness in many cases. 
Adoption of the ALI recommendation regarding the dissolution 
of domestic partnerships will not undermine the institutions of mar-
riage and family because (1) the recommendation essentially reflects 
developing state law in many respects, (2) to the extent that it does 
not, the recommendation is unlikely to cause confusion either in the 
courts or in society about what marriage and family mean, who in 
fact is married, or what constitutes a family, and (3) the recommen-
dation changes the current incentive structure in many states, 
thereby making marriage more attractive. Because the ALI recom-
mendation restricts itself to inter se benefits and because states al-
ready recognize claims of nonmarital partners to a share of the assets 
acquired during the relationship, the ALI proposal is likely to have 
relatively little effect on societal or legal understandings of marriage 
but a potentially large effect on the lives of individual claimants. 
Part II of this Article describes which couples can qualify as do-
mestic partners and how domestic partnerships differ from marriages. 
Part III discusses the policy and fairness considerations that militate 
in favor of imposing financial obligations on domestic partners with 
respect to one another and in favor of shifting the background pre-
sumptions regarding when the division of property or the provision 
of support would appropriately be ordered upon dissolution of such 
a relationship. Part IV discusses use of the contract paradigm to de-
cide when support or a property division might be ordered, suggest-
ing that although this model has certain advantages, the required 
“meeting of the minds”3 poses unnecessary difficulties. Part V dis-
cusses the potential for conceptual confusion regarding which rela-
tionships are marriages and which are not. This section makes clear 
that courts and society have had no difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween these different types of relationships and discusses how the 
contract paradigm itself mischaracterizes the nonmarital cohabitant 
 
 3. Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 623 N.W.2d 84, 90 (S.D. 2001) (“To form a contract, 
there must be a meeting of the minds or mutual assent on all essential terms.”) (citing Read v. 
McKennan Hosp., 610 N.W.2d 782, 786 (S.D. 2000)). 
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relationship in important respects. The article concludes that al-
though there are weaknesses in the ALI proposal, it has a variety of 
strengths and deserves serious consideration. 
II. MARRIAGE AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 
The ALI domestic partnership proposal cannot be evaluated until 
its basic elements are understood. The proposal permits a wide range 
of couples to qualify for domestic partnership status as long as cer-
tain conditions have been met. However, the proposal makes clear 
that domestic partnerships are not the equivalent of marriage and 
that the latter has a variety of benefits that the former does not. 
A. Who Are Domestic Partners? 
Domestic partners are defined as “two persons of the same or 
opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant pe-
riod of time share a primary residence and a life together as a cou-
ple.”4 Whether a couple has shared a life together will be determined 
in light of a number of factors including the parties’ “oral or written 
statements,” 5 the extent to which their finances were intermingled, 6 
“[t]he extent to which their relationship fostered . . . [either] inter-
dependence” or one party’s dependence on the other, 7 the extent to 
which the members of the couple acted or assumed roles in further-
ance of their life together,8 the “extent to which the relationship 
wrought change in the life” of either party, 9 the emotional or physi-
cal intimacy of the relationship,10 and the reputation of the couple in 
the community.11 While couples “not related by blood or adoption” 
will be presumed to be domestic partners if they have maintained a 
common household for a sufficiently long and continuous period of 
time,12 couples who are “related by blood or adoption” will not en-
joy that presumption, but nonetheless can qualify as domestic part-
 
 4. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(1). 
 5. Id. § 6.03(7)(a). 
 6. See id. § 6.03(7)(b). 
 7. Id. § 6.03(7)(c). 
 8. See id. § 6.03(7)(d). 
 9. See id. § 6.03(7)(e). 
 10. See id. § 6.03(7)(h). 
 11. See id. § 6.03(7)(i). 
 12. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d. 
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ners.13 
The ALI recommendation requires that the individuals live to-
gether, and a couple that might otherwise be treated as domestic 
partners will not be so treated if the couple does not share a primary 
residence.14 This reflects a requirement that states sometimes impose. 
For example, in Taylor v. Fields,15 a California appellate court refused 
to enforce a promise of “lifetime financial care,”16 at least in part, be-
cause Taylor did not make a “showing of a stable and significant re-
lationship evolving out of cohabitation,”17 notwithstanding her hav-
ing had a forty-two year relationship with Fields.18 Because the 
couple had never lived together19 but at most had occasionally spent 
weekends together as husband and wife,20 the court held that a nec-
essary prerequisite to recovery for nonmarital partners was lacking.21 
Even if the individuals share a residence, the ALI requirement 
that individuals share a residence for a significant period of time will 
not afford individuals a claim when they have only spent a week or a 
month together.22 However, the ALI specifically eschews a bright-
line rule to determine what constitutes a “significant period of time” 
for purposes of establishing whether a domestic partnership exists,23 
suggesting instead that “the greater the change wrought by the rela-
tionship on the life of either or both parties, and the greater the 
losses associated with dissolution of the relationship, the shorter the 
 
 13. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d (“[W]hen parties are related by blood or adoption . . . the claim-
ant bears the burden of satisfying the proof of requirements of Paragraph (6).”). 
 14. See id. § 6.03 cmt. c, illus. 1. 
 15. 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 16. Id. at 192. 
 17. Id. at 189. The court also refused to enforce the agreement because it held that the 
contract was based on illicit meretricious consideration. See id. at 193 (“Leaving aside the lack 
of a claim of cohabitation for the purposes of discussing this point, here, as in Jones, Taylor’s 
rendering of sexual services for Leo is inseparable from the rest of the contract. . . . [That] ser-
vice forms an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and renders it unenforce-
able in its entirety.”). 
 18. See id. at 188. 
 19. See id. at 189, 192. 
 20. See id. at 192. 
 21. See id. 
 22. The ALI implies that three years would be a reasonable period for a couple without 
children. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. d. 
 23. Id. § 6.03 cmt. e (“‘[A] significant period of time’ should not be set by a uniform 
rule.”). 
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period of time necessary to satisfy the requirement.”24 
States adopting the ALI recommendation that no bright line be 
established would thereby afford the courts some flexibility with re-
spect to whether a domestic partnership existed in a particular case. 
As an added benefit, state adoption of the recommendation might 
dissuade potential defendants from engaging in “strategic behav-
ior,”25 such as forcing a partner to leave the home a week before the 
relationship would have qualified as a domestic partnership. 
Of course, according courts this flexibility may result in courts 
occasionally wrongly determining that certain individuals are or are 
not domestic partners. Further, there is the systemic cost that is im-
posed when courts are required to hear and weigh evidence to de-
termine whether particular individuals are domestic partners rather 
than, for example, ascertain whether they have met criteria that 
might be applied mechanically. The gains in fairness by affording the 
courts this discretion, however, would presumably more than out-
weigh these added costs.26 
B. Domestic Partnerships Versus Marriages 
Chapter 6 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
discusses the “legal obligations that domestic partners have toward 
one another at the dissolution of their relationship.”27 Individuals 
who have been domestic partners for a significant period of time may 
be subject to claims for support or property division when their rela-
tionship ends.28 However, the ALI takes great care to distinguish be-
tween the rights and responsibilities of marital partners and the 
rights and responsibilities of domestic partners. “Marriage creates a 
legal status that encompasses not only inter se rights and responsibili-
ties of the spouses, but also rights and responsibilities of the spouses 
in relation to third parties and the state.”29 In contrast, while 
“American law has recognized inter se claims of domestic partners, it 
has generally declined to establish rights with respect to third parties 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See infra Part III (discussing fairness concerns). 
 27. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. a. 
 28. See id. § 6.03 cmt. b. 
 29. Id. § 6.01 cmt. a. 
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and the state.”30 
The ALI proposal is thus modeled on current state law. Rather 
than suggest, for example, that the state afford certain benefits to 
domestic partners, the recommendation involves a modification and 
clarification of the conditions under which domestic partners will 
have acquired financial obligations with respect to one another and 
of the contents of those obligations once acquired. 
The ALI recommendation does not equate domestic partnership 
with marriage. On the contrary, it emphasizes important differences 
between these two types of relationships. For example, a state recog-
nizing this new domestic partnership status does not thereby recog-
nize a new form of marriage and would not be forced to extend 
benefits to a new set of beneficiaries. Indeed, rather than create an 
additional drain on limited state resources, this recommendation, if 
adopted, would help to relieve the state of some of the financial ob-
ligations that it might otherwise be forced to bear. The recommen-
dation would protect “society from social welfare burdens that 
should be borne, in whole or in part, by individuals”31 since it re-
quires the distribution of assets acquired during the relationship 
rather than permitting the shrewd party to keep the assets and forc-
ing the less sophisticated party to seek public assistance. 
Consider two unmarried individuals, Lee and Pat, who have lived 
together for decades. Lee works outside the home, and Pat works in-
side the home. All the property that has been acquired during the re-
lationship is in Lee’s name, notwithstanding that Lee has been able 
to devote time and energy to the acquisition of these assets precisely 
because Pat has been doing so much work within the home. Were 
these individuals to separate, Pat might be left without any property 
or means of support and might have to receive public assistance. 
However, were they to separate after the jurisdiction in which they 
lived had adopted the ALI domestic partnership recommendation, 
Pat would receive some of the property acquired during the relation-
ship and, in addition, might be entitled to support. 
 The ALI makes clear that states adopting its recommendation 
would not thereby “revive the doctrine of common-law marriage.”32 
Common law marriage not only affects the rights and responsibilities 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02(2). 
 32. Id. § 6.01 cmt. a. 
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of the partners with respect to each other but also affects the rights 
and responsibilities of third parties with respect to the couple,33 
whereas the proposed change would only affect the rights and re-
sponsibilities of the parties themselves.34 Thus, according to the ALI 
domestic partnership proposal, a state or employer would not be re-
quired to extend to a domestic partner the benefits that would be 
due to a spouse. Had the ALI instead recommended a reinstitution 
of common law marriage,35 perhaps coupled with a recommendation 
of a change in the name of such unions to “domestic partnerships,” 
the states and employers would potentially have been subject to a va-
riety of new financial responsibilities.36 
States have had no difficulty distinguishing between marriages 
and long-term nonmarital relationships. Consider Williams v. Cor-
bett,37 a case in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that a 
woman in a meretricious38 relationship was not entitled to workers’ 
compensation benefits as a dependent of a worker who had died on 
the job.39 Had the woman had a common law marriage instead of 
having merely cohabited with the deceased,40 she might have been 
able to receive those benefits.41 Consider also Jones v. D. Canale & 
 
 33. See id. § 6.01 cmt. a (“Where recognized, common-law marriage is fully equivalent 
to ceremonial, or formal marriage. In terms of legal incidents, there is no distinction between a 
lawful common-law marriage and a lawful ceremonial marriage.”). 
 34. Indeed, the rights of third parties such as innocent spouses whose marital partners 
have established domestic partnerships with others would also not be affected by these provi-
sions. See id. § 6.01 cmt. c (“The rule . . . defers fully to the claims of a spouse, but allows 
claims of a domestic partner to the extent that they would not displace those of a spouse.”). 
 35. Common law marriages are often thought to be fraught with difficulties including 
proving their existence. They have been described as “a fruitful source of perjury and fraud.” 
Estate of Gavula (Appeal of Ardos), 417 A.2d 168, 171 (Pa. 1980). 
 36. See Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly 
Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163, 196 (1985) (“The purpose in repealing com-
mon-law marriage statutes was to deny couples selecting informal, non-ceremonial arrange-
ments the status benefits of marriage.”). 
 37. 398 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1990). 
 38. Formerly, in many states, meretricious relationships (i.e., sexual relationships which 
were nonmarital) had a pejorative connotation. See, e.g., Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 21 
(Mich. 1999) (distinguishing between “conventional marriages” on the one hand and “‘illicit’ 
or ‘meretricious’ relationships” on the other hand) (quoting Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 
1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979)). Some states now no longer use the term pejoratively. See infra notes 
60, 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Williams, 398 S.E.2d at 2. 
 40. See id. (affirming that “one cannot recover dependency benefits arising from a living 
arrangement that includes neither ceremonial nor common-law marriage.”). 
 41. See id. See also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Smith, 259 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 
11STR.DOC 12/5/01  2:27 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1142 
Co.,42 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court had to determine 
whether the plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation death 
benefits after the death of her partner of twenty-five years.43 The 
court held that she was not entitled to those benefits because both 
she and her partner had known that they were not legally married.44 
Had she validly contracted a common law marriage with him in an-
other state45 or even had she believed falsely, but in good faith, that 
she was married to the decedent and thus been a putative spouse, she 
might have qualified for benefits.46 
A separate issue is whether a widowed person who has a meretri-
cious relationship would stop receiving the workers’ compensation 
benefits which had been awarded after the former spouse’s death. 
That might depend upon the construction of the existing statute.47 
For example, the Delaware statute extinguishes survivor benefits only 
upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse.48 In Wilming-
ton Finishing Co. v. Leary,49 a Delaware court refused to read the re-
marriage provision as including those who were in a meretricious re-
lationship precisely because that would treat the latter relationship as 
if it were a common law marriage, which Delaware refuses to recog-
nize.50 
 
1979) (remanding workers’ compensation benefits case to determine whether claimant was 
common law wife of deceased). 
 42. 652 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. 1983). 
 43. See id. at 336. 
 44. See id. at 338. See also Lavoie v. Int’l Paper Co., 403 A.2d 1186, 1191 (Me. 1979) 
(“We find nothing in the Act as it now exists . . . which would indicate that the Legislature 
intended to enlarge the meaning of the word ‘family’ under the Workers’ Compensation Act 
to include a woman with whom a deceased employee was living in a union not solemnized by 
formal marriage.”). 
 45. See Shelby County v. Williams, 510 S.W.2d 73, 73–74 (Tenn. 1974) (“Though 
Tennessee does not recognize as valid a common law marriage contracted within this state, our 
courts do recognize as valid a common law marriage contracted in a state where such a mar-
riage is valid.”) (quoting Troxel v. Jones, 322 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958)) (citations 
omitted). 
 46. See D. Canale & Co., 652 S.W.2d at 338 (discussing case in which benefits were 
granted when claimant believed falsely but in good faith that she was married to the decedent). 
 47. See, e.g., Todd v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 692 A.2d 1086 (Pa. 1997) (con-
struing statute to permit widow to receive benefits). 
 48. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2330(g) (1995) (“Should any dependent of a de-
ceased employee die, or should the surviving spouse remarry, the right of such dependent or 
such surviving spouse to compensation under this section shall cease.”); Wilmington Finishing 
Co. v. Leary, No. 99A-06-001 JEB, 2000 WL 303320, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2000). 
 49. 2000 WL 303320. 
 50. See id. at *3. 
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The ALI proposal that public benefits not be awarded to domes-
tic partnerships follows the example set by several,51 but not all,52 
states. For example, in Peffley-Warner v. Bowen,53 the Washington 
Supreme Court held that a woman who had been in a meretricious 
relationship for twenty-two years54 did not qualify as a wife under the 
laws of intestate succession, which meant that she could not receive 
widow’s benefits under the Social Security Act.55 That court reached 
a similar result in Davis v. Employment Security Department,56 in 
which a woman who had quit her job to live with her domestic part-
ner in another place was denied unemployment benefits because she 
was held to have voluntarily left her job without good cause.57 Had 
she instead “voluntarily [left] her job in order to marry and move to 
a place where it would be impracticable to commute to her old 
job,”58 she would have had good cause for stopping work.59 The 
court explained that “while the definition of the term ‘meretricious’ 
has lost its original derogatory connotation in recent court decisions, 
the term ‘marital’ is still defined as ‘of or relating to marriage or the 
marriage state.’”60 Precisely because marriage and domestic partner-
ships are not equivalent, the court refused to hold that the plaintiff’s 
quitting for the sake of a domestic partnership qualified as leaving for 
good cause.61 
 
 51. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Jewel, 164 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (“In 
cases where there was a meretricious relationship as knowingly living in adultery, most of the 
courts have denied compensation, basing this denial on grounds of public policy.”) (citations 
omitted). In this case, the court denied worker’s compensation benefits to a woman who had 
been involved in a meretricious (and, in fact, adulterous) relationship with the deceased em-
ployee. See id. at 847–48. 
 52. See West v. Barton-Malow Co., 230 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1975) (permitting woman 
in meretricious relationship to receive workers’ compensation death benefits); Dep’t of Indus. 
Relations v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1979) (permitting 
woman in meretricious relationship with the deceased to receive workers’ compensation death 
benefits); Parkinson v. J. & S. Tool Co., 313 A.2d 609 (N.J. 1974) (permitting woman living 
with but no longer civilly married to decedent to receive workers’ compensation death bene-
fits). 
 53. 778 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1989) (en banc). 
 54. See id. at 1023. 
 55. See id. at 1023, 1027. 
 56. 737 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). 
 57. See id. at 1264. 
 58. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added). 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY). 
 61. See id. 
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The Davis court’s analysis is important to consider for at least 
two reasons. It makes clear both that “meretricious,” at least when 
applied to relationships,62 no longer carries the negative association 
that it once had63 and that courts have no difficulty distinguishing 
between marital and nonmarital relationships. 
The California Supreme Court has also made clear that it can 
easily distinguish between marital and nonmarital relationships. In 
Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,64 the court de-
nied unemployment compensation benefits to someone who had 
quit her job to join her fiancé in the state of Washington.65 The 
court pointed out that the claimant had not “represent[ed] that her 
marriage was imminent, that her presence in Washington was re-
quired to prepare for the wedding, or, indeed, that she had any defi-
nite or fixed marital plans.”66 The court explained that California law 
does not “equate a nonmarital relationship with marriage”67 and 
suggested that the “[l]egislature’s decision to give weight to marital 
relationships in the determination of ‘good cause’ supports public 
policy encouraging marriage . . . .”68 
It might seem surprising that the court would deny unemploy-
ment benefits to a fiancé in the name of promoting marriage. The 
decision is more understandable in light of the court’s skepticism 
that the plaintiff would actually marry her partner. Noting that the 
plaintiff had not married during the two years that the case had 
 
 62. But see infra notes 175–80 and accompanying text, (describing instead meretricious 
sexual services). 
 63. For other courts suggesting that the pejorative connotation of “meretricious” does 
not reflect what is involved in many long-term nonmarital relationships, see West v. Barton-
Malow Co., 230 N.W.2d 545, 546 (Mich. 1975) (“If we read meretricious as the dictionary 
defines it—the relationship of a prostitute or a woman given to indiscriminate lewdness—we 
find no support whatsoever in the record for describing the relationship that existed between 
deceased and plaintiff as one based on meretricious cohabitation.”); and Kozlowski v. 
Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 909 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman, J., concurring) (“In recent years, co-
habitation between unmarried adults has become an increasingly prevalent phenomenon. To 
label such conduct as ‘meretricious’—that is, as akin to prostitution—would ignore the realities 
of today’s society.”). 
 64. 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). But see MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. 
Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d 453 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the lack of a legally recognized marriage 
did not prevent plaintiff from showing good cause for leaving employment because plaintiff 
had established a family unit consisting of herself, her fiancé, and their child). 
 65. See Norman, 663 P.2d at 905. 
 66. Id. at 906. 
 67. Id. at 907. 
 68. Id. at 908. 
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wound its way through the courts,69 the court at least implicitly 
treated the case as if it had involved nonmarital cohabitants. 
States should not refuse an individual unemployment compensa-
tion because that individual quits a job to join a domestic partner. 
Indeed, permitting receipt of benefits in such a case promotes many 
of the same societal interests that would be promoted in a case in 
which an individual quits a job to join a marital spouse. Nonetheless, 
the fact that states may deny such compensation in those circum-
stances illustrates that courts neither confuse nor conflate marital and 
domestic partnership status. Thus, adoption of the ALI recommen-
dation should not be avoided for fear that such confusion or confla-
tion would occur. 
III. THE PROMOTION OF FAIRNESS 
The overriding justification for the ALI proposal is to promote 
fairness. In many cases, the less sophisticated or more trusting part-
ner suffers when a nonmarital relationship ends and the assets ac-
quired during that relationship are distributed. Adoption of the ALI 
recommendation would promote a much fairer distribution of assets 
in many of the kinds of cases under examination here. 
A. What Is Fair? 
The primary objective of the ALI recommendation is the “fair 
distribution of the economic gains and losses incident to termination 
of the relationship of domestic partners.”70 Ascertaining which dis-
tribution would be fair is the difficult task. Even where the parties 
have expressly agreed to a particular distribution, worries about coer-
cion and deception may arise. However, most couples do not ex-
pressly state how their assets should be distributed should their rela-
tionship end, and the failure to do so makes it all the more difficult 
for courts to effect a fair distribution of the assets acquired during 
the relationship. 
All else equal, fairness dictates distributing the assets acquired 
during the relationship in accordance with the express agreement of 
the parties, and, in fact, the ALI recommendation suggests that an 
 
 69. See id. at 909 (“It may be of some interest that, indeed, at oral argument more than 
2 years later, we were informed that no marriage had as yet occurred.”). 
 70. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02. 
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express agreement with respect to the distribution of assets should be 
enforced,71 absent unconscionability, fraud, etc.72 However, this 
method of resolution would cover only a small percentage of the 
cases since few couples “make explicit contracts to govern their rela-
tionship or its termination,”73 notwithstanding the “rapidly increas-
ing percentage of Americans [who] form domestic relationships”74 
without observing the formalities of marriage. 
B. Default Rules 
Where no explicit agreement has been made, there must be some 
default rule regarding how the property is to be allocated should the 
relationship come to an end, even if the recommended distribution 
involves leaving the property with the person who currently possesses 
or has title to it.75 Traditionally, where no express agreement was 
made, whoever had title to the property at issue could keep it.76 The 
advantages of this rule, which might be called the “title theory,” in-
clude clarity and predictability. Absent an explicit agreement to the 
contrary, the person with title would own the property in question, 
and courts would not be faced with difficult decisions regarding the 
 
 71. The recommendation explains: 
A contract between domestic partners that (i) waives or limits claims that would 
otherwise arise under this Chapter or (ii) provides remedies not provided by this 
Chapter, is enforceable according to its terms and displaces any inconsistent claims 
under this Chapter, so long as it satisfies the requirements of Chapter 7 for the en-
forcement of agreements. 
See id. § 6.01(2). 
 72. See id. ch. 7 for a discussion of the conditions under which contracts should not be 
enforced. 
 73. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a. 
 74. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a. 
 75. See Beal v. Beal, where the court stated: 
Historically, courts have been reluctant to grant relief of any kind to a party who was 
involved in what was termed a “meretricious” relationship. Courts took the position 
that the parties had entered into a relationship outside the bounds of law, and the 
courts would not allow themselves to be used to solve the property disputes evolv-
ing from that relationship. Generally, the parties were left as they were when they 
came to court, with ownership resting in whoever happened to have title or posses-
sion at the time. The rationale was predicated on public policy or even an invocation 
of the clean hands doctrine. 
577 P.2d 507, 508 (Or. 1978) (en banc). 
 76. See Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 768 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (“Awarding 
property to the one with title had been the rule in cases where courts refused to act in non-
marital relationships.”). 
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appropriate distribution of assets when the intents of the parties 
could not be clearly ascertained. 
 While the title theory has advantages, it has serious disadvan-
tages as well. For example, the title theory is likely to lead to inequi-
table results and to put at risk exactly those individuals who are least 
likely to be equipped to adequately assess that risk. An Oregon ap-
pellate court explained that employing such a rule often results in 
unfairness, since it gives an “advantage to the party who was more 
cunning or shrewd.”77 Looking beyond who has title to the con-
tested property “prevent[s] the party with title, or [the party] in pos-
session of property, from enjoying ownership without consideration 
of the contribution of the other party.”78 
Consider, for example, Sharp v. Kosmalski 79 in which a fifty-six- 
year-old widower, Sharp, “whose education did not go beyond the 
eighth grade, developed a very close relationship with” a school 
teacher, Ms. Kosmalski.80 He bestowed gifts on her and eventually 
proposed to her. Kosmalski refused Sharp’s offer of marriage, but 
continued to accept gifts from him and, with his permission, with-
drew substantial sums of money from his bank account.81 Eventually, 
Sharp conveyed his interest in his farm to her.82 Not long after,83 
Kosmalski ordered Sharp to leave the home, at which point he had 
assets of only $300.84 The New York Court of Appeals remanded the 
case for a determination of whether the defendant had been unjustly 
enriched.85 The court warned that the “case seem[ed] to present the 
classic example of a situation where equity should intervene to scru-
tinize a transaction pregnant with opportunity for abuse and unfair-
ness.”86 Had the court merely looked at the express agreement of the 
parties, it likely would have held that Kosmalski must be allowed to 
retain the property, Sharp’s lack of sophistication notwithstanding. 87 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 351 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1976). 
 80. See id. at 722. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Sharp conveyed his interest to Kosmalski in September 1971, and Kosmalski ordered 
Sharp out of the home in February 1973. See id. at 723. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 724. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 723. To make matters worse, Sharp had only recently been widowed (the 
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C. Hewitt v. Hewitt 
In Hewitt v. Hewitt,88 the Illinois Supreme Court had to decide 
whether to distribute property in a case involving two nonmarital 
cohabitants who had separated.89 Hewitt is important both because it 
has been discussed in numerous cases90 and because the weaknesses 
of the opinion suggest some of the weaknesses in arguments against 
adoption of the ALI proposal. 
In Hewitt, the plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant had 
lived together “in an unmarried, family-like relationship to which 
three children [had] been born”91 and that he had promised “he 
would ‘share his life, his future, his earnings and his property’ with 
her.”92 The intermediate appellate court found that there had been 
an express oral contract on which plaintiff could base her cause of ac-
tion.93 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, fearing that recognizing 
her cause of action would mean that “unmarried cohabitants [could] 
acquire property rights merely by cohabitation and subsequent sepa-
ration,”94 notwithstanding plaintiff’s claim that those cases were dis-
tinguishable because her claim was based on an express contract.95 
The Illinois high court rejected the approach in which only ex-
press contracts would be enforced, apparently agreeing with the in-
termediate appellate court and the California Supreme Court96 that 
“if common law principles of express contract govern express agree-
ments between unmarried cohabitants, common law principles of 
implied contract, equitable relief and constructive trust must govern 
the parties’ relations in the absence of such an agreement.”97 Yet, the 
court failed to note that (1) a jurisdiction might choose to enforce 
 
case does not indicate how long after the death the conveyance occurred), see id. at 722, and, 
thus, was likely even more vulnerable than he might have been. 
 88. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). 
 89. See id. at 1205. 
 90. See, e.g., Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. 1999); Goode v. Goode, 396 
S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990); County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993). 
 91. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1205. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 1206. 
 94. Id. at 1207–11. 
 95. See id. 
 96. The Hewitt court was referring to the California Supreme Court’s decision in 
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 97. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207. 
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only express contracts,98 and (2) even if a jurisdiction recognized im-
plied contracts and a variety of equitable remedies, the parties would 
not be acquiring property rights simply by virtue of living together 
but instead because of implicit understandings or society’s need to 
promote justice and fairness. 
The Hewitt court feared that by upholding the lower court deci-
sion it would somehow “rehabilitate the doctrine of common law 
marriage,”99 notwithstanding its recognition that affirming the lower 
court decision would not entitle the plaintiff, Victoria, to have all the 
benefits that a common law spouse would have had.100 Despite lan-
guage in the opinion to the contrary, the court would likely have re-
versed the intermediate appellate decision even if it had been per-
suaded that an affirmance would not have rehabilitated common law 
marriage. The court believed that “[o]f substantially greater impor-
tance than the rights of the immediate parties [was] the impact of 
such recognition upon our society and the institution of mar-
riage,”101 which is why the court’s recognition that the plaintiff’s 
claims had merit was ultimately unavailing.102 
Ironically, it is doubtful that permitting recovery would have had 
a significant impact upon society or the institution of marriage,103 
and “cohabitation has flourished [in Illinois] despite judicial unwill-
ingness to recognize contracts between cohabitants.”104 Given that a 
Hewitt affirmance would likely have had little or no adverse impact 
on society, the decision was especially unfortunate since, as an Illi-
 
 98. The Minnesota statute states, in pertinent part: 
If sexual relations between the parties are contemplated, a contract between a man 
and a woman who are living together in this state out of wedlock, or who are about 
to commence living together in this state out of wedlock, is enforceable as to terms 
concerning the property and financial relations of the parties only if: 
(1) the contract is written and signed by the parties, and 
(2) enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 2000). 
 99. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. at 1207. 
 102. See id. at 1211 (“We do not intend to suggest that plaintiff’s claims are totally de-
void of merit.”). 
 103. See Jan Skelton, Hewitt to Ayala: A Wrong Turn for Cohabitants’ Rights, 82 ILL. B.J. 
364, 366 (1994) (“[I]t is unlikely that refusing to recognize the contracts of cohabitants actu-
ally encourages marriages or discourages cohabitation.”). 
 104. Id. (citing Gary Lloyd Smith, Hewitt v. Hewitt: Non-Marital Cohabitation and the 
Doctrine of Immorality, 69 ILL. B.J. 368, 371 (1981)). 
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nois appellate court has subsequently suggested, “[t]he result in 
Hewitt was particularly harsh in light of its facts.”105 
Bracketing whether Hewitt was rightly decided, some of the 
bases upon which that decision rested have either since disappeared 
or have been accounted for in more nuanced ways by other states.106 
For example, the Hewitt court emphasized that the Illinois legisla-
ture had refused to adopt no-fault divorce.107 However, since the de-
cision, Illinois has adopted no-fault divorce and has decriminalized 
cohabitation,108 thus undermining the claim that Illinois public pol-
icy differs substantially from that of other states in these respects.109 
The Hewitt court noted that under Illinois statutory law, a puta-
tive spouse has the rights of a legal spouse “if he goes through a 
marriage ceremony and cohabits with another in the good-faith be-
lief that he is validly married.”110 Once he or she learns of the invalid-
ity of the marriage, the status of putative spouse terminates. The 
court concluded that this statutory language indicates an “unmis-
takeable [sic] legislative judgment disfavoring the grant of mutual 
property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”111 Yet, at least 
as plausible a way to interpret the Illinois legislature’s intent would 
have been to say that the legislature granted the putative spouse the 
“rights of a legal spouse”112 precisely because that person would have 
had a reasonable and justified expectation of those benefits until he 
or she had learned of the invalidity of the marriage. 
If this is the correct interpretation, however, then there are im-
portant implications for the treatment of the nonmarital cohabitant. 
While the nonmarital cohabitant might not have a justified and rea-
sonable expectation with respect to benefits provided by third par-
ties, he or she probably would have such an expectation with respect 
to those benefits expressly or impliedly promised by his or her part-
ner, and, thus, a promise to confer such benefits should be enforce-
 
 105. Medley v. Strong, 588 N.E.2d 244, 246 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990). 
 106. See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (discussing Tennessee’s treatment of 
nonmarital cohabitants). 
 107. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210. 
 108. See Skelton, supra note 103, at 366 (noting the Illinois Legislature’s adoption of no-
fault divorce and decriminalization of cohabitation). 
 109. See id. (noting the change in Illinois public policy). 
 110. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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able. The legislative intent to promote fairness and to prevent the 
disappointment of reasonable and justified expectations would be 
served by allowing the nonmarital cohabitant to receive those bene-
fits. 
The interpretation of the Illinois legislature’s intent offered 
above—that promises between nonmarital partners are enforceable 
but that third-party obligations are not thereby created—reflects the 
manner in which some states have handled the difference between 
spouses and nonmarital cohabitants. The former is entitled to third-
party benefits and the latter is only entitled to inter se benefits.113 For 
example, while refusing to recognize an obligation to extend benefits 
to nonmarital cohabitants,114 the Tennessee Supreme Court has 
manifested a more generous attitude with respect to nonmarital 
partners’ inter se obligations and benefits. In Martin v. Coleman,115 
the court was willing to divide up a business between two unmarried 
cohabitants, notwithstanding that the two had “a meretricious rela-
tionship,”116 and one stayed at home while the other provided for 
the financial needs of the couple.117 
Three factors suggest that Hewitt should no longer be followed: 
(1) the existence of a different and plausible explanation of legislative 
intent that would have supported a different result; (2) legislative ac-
tions subsequent to Hewitt that undermined the basis upon which 
that decision was made; and (3) the potential for very harsh and un-
fair results if Hewitt is neither overruled118 nor confined to its facts. 
Regrettably, Illinois courts have nonetheless continued to reward the 
nonmarital cohabitant who is shrewd enough to keep the property in 
 
 113. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (discussing the Tennessee Supreme 
Court’s treatment of D. Canale & Co.). 
 114. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the fact 
that the parties knew that they were not married). 
 115. 19 S.W.3d 757 (Tenn. 2000). 
 116. Martin, 19 S.W.3d at 761 (Tenn. 2000); see also Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38 
(Tenn. 1991) (inferring existence of a partnership from the circumstances and allowing distri-
bution of assets to a domestic partner). 
 117. See Martin, 19 S.W.3d at 759 (“Delores Coleman did not work outside the home. 
Robert Coleman, an engineer, was the family’s sole provider.”). 
 118. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court might take the opportunity to overrule the Hewitt 
decision in light of subsequent legislative actions and cases that have undermined the decision. 
Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[W]e have overruled our prece-
dents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings . . . .”) (citing 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)). 
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his own name.119 
In Ayala v. Fox,120 Lawrence Fox proposed to the plaintiff “that 
they jointly pay for the construction of a single-family home,”121 
“promis[ing] plaintiff that title to the property would be transferred 
to their names as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and that 
plaintiff Ayala would receive one-half of the equity of the house in 
the event that they stopped residing together.”122 However, “Fox 
failed to transfer the title into joint tenancy and failed to pay plaintiff 
her half of the equity in the property.”123 Notwithstanding the clear 
agreement and plaintiff’s actions supporting the existence of that 
agreement,124 the court denied recovery, suggesting that plaintiff was 
“seeking recovery based on rights closely resembling those arising 
from a conventional marriage, namely, an equitable interest in the 
‘marital’ residence.”125 The court feared that if it were to uphold the 
plaintiff’s rights, it “would, in effect, be granting to an unmarried 
cohabitant substantially the same marital rights as those which mar-
ried persons enjoy.”126 
The Ayala court’s reasoning is unpersuasive. Merely because the 
plaintiff was seeking an equitable remedy to enforce a promise to 
share title in property does not somehow imply that the plaintiff was 
seeking to have the parties treated as if they had married. Had they 
shared living quarters but not had a sexual relationship, the court 
presumably would have enforced the agreement, notwithstanding 
that it would thereby have given an equitable interest in the common 
residence. The Ayala decision rewarded deception and unfair dealing 
and can hardly be thought to have implemented good public policy. 
 
 119. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 205–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (dis-
cussing Hewitt with approval when denying claim of same-sex partner to survivor benefits). 
 120. 564 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 121. Id. at 920. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. As stated by the court: 
In reliance on Fox’s promises, plaintiff obligated herself to pay a $48,000 mortgage, 
which was recorded on May 16, 1978. . . . From September 1978 to October 1988, 
plaintiff and Fox lived in the house and jointly contributed to the mortgage pay-
ments. From 1978 to 1981, Fox was unemployed, and, consequently, plaintiff paid 
the majority of the mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance during that period. 
Id. 
 125. Id. at 922. 
 126. Id. 
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IV. THE CONTRACT PARADIGM 
Some states have distributed the assets acquired during a non-
marital relationship in light of contract principles. While this is pref-
erable to the policy suggested by the Hewitt court, this approach 
nonetheless has drawbacks which the ALI proposal avoids, since the 
difficulties in establishing the parties’ intentions may militate in favor 
of modifying the presumptions usually employed in the contract 
paradigm.127 
A. The Express or Implied Contract Model of Relationships 
States use a variety of doctrines to avoid unfair results when 
nonmarital relationships end. Some states make use of contract prin-
ciples to govern allocation of the partnership resources, whether the 
agreements have been express or merely implied.128 Others make use 
of equitable doctrines like unjust enrichment to assure a fair alloca-
tion of goods acquired during the relationship.129 
In Shuraleff v. Donnelly,130 an Oregon case, the parties separated 
after having lived together for fourteen years.131 The court had to 
decide how the parties’ property should be divided, which depended 
on the appropriate characterization of the parties’ relationship.132 
The parties owned farmland on which they had planted holly for 
eventual sale. The plaintiff, Shuraleff, argued that she and her partner 
 
 127. For reasons that the contract paradigm is inappropriate because it mischaracterizes 
the relationship at issue, see infra notes 197–211 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Wilcox v. Trautz, where the court stated: 
These financial and property arrangements stem from a relationship that involves 
sexual cohabitation, but, in creating them, the parties are principally motivated by an 
intention to hold, or dispose of, property in a mutually acceptable way in order to 
manage day-to-day matters and to avoid litigation when the relationship ends. Such 
financial planning is enforceable according to the usual rules of contract. 
693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998). 
 129. See Suggs v. Norris, where the court stated: 
We now make clear and adopt the rule that agreements regarding the finances and 
property of an unmarried but cohabiting couple, whether express or implied, are en-
forceable as long as sexual services or promises thereof do not provide the considera-
tion for such agreements. Moreover, where appropriate, the equitable remedies of 
constructive and resulting trusts should be available as should recovery under a 
quasi-contractual theory on quantum meruit. 
364 S.E.2d 159, 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
 130. 817 P.2d 764 (Or. Ct. App. 1991). 
 131. See id. at 765. 
 132. See id. 
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had merely had a “‘business’ relationship”133 and that “the only 
property subject to distribution [was] the real property held in joint 
names.”134 Notwithstanding that each had business skills that had 
been contributed to the business (she in investment and manage-
ment and he in building and maintenance135), the court rejected the 
contention that the couple had had a pure business relationship.136 
After noting that some of the properties acquired during the rela-
tionship “were in the names of the parties as ‘husband and wife,’”137 
that the defendant, Donnelly, was listed as a beneficiary of Shuraleff’s 
Public Employees Retirement System account,138 and that “neither 
party had assigned a value to the other’s labor”139 in their business, 
the court concluded that their relationship had been a “domestic 
one”140 and held that an equitable result could only be achieved “by 
including assets held in each party’s name alone.”141 
In Shuraleff, the plaintiff had put some of the assets in her own 
name and had instructed their accountant not to discuss these mat-
ters with Donnelly.142 The plaintiff thereby indicated her intent not 
to have these assets jointly owned.143 Although the court accepted 
that plaintiff did not intend that these assets be jointly held, it noted 
that “a mechanistic application . . . regarding ‘intent’ would reward 
 
 133. Id. at 766. 
 134. Id. 
 135. The court explained why it refused to accept that the couple had only had a business 
relationship: 
Despite plaintiff’s attempt to characterize the relationship here as only a “business” 
one, it was a domestic one. The parties had an intimate relationship and lived to-
gether for 14 years. Although plaintiff claimed that she and defendant strictly ac-
counted each month for individual expenses, the evidence shows that, over the 
years, accounts were often muddled with both parties making trade-offs. Further-
more, in this so-called “business” relationship, neither party assigned a value to the 
other’s labor. Plaintiff’s strengths were primarily in investment and management. 
Defendant used his physical skills and knowledge of construction to construct the 
homes and the bridge and to improve the properties. 
Id. at 767. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. at 765. 
 138. See id. at 766 n.2. She was “a teacher and consultant in the Eugene public school 
system.” Id. at 765. 
 139. Id. at 767. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 768. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
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plaintiff, despite her failure to make it clear to defendant, in the face 
of his belief in their common goal, that she was subtracting her in-
vestments from that endeavor.” 144 Rather than refuse to include the 
separate property in the distribution because the parties did not have 
a common intent with respect to which properties would be jointly 
owned, the Shuraleff court instead promoted equity by including the 
separate property within the distribution. Here, fairness required go-
ing beyond the terms of the parties’ agreement, and use of a formal 
contract model would have produced inequitable results.145 
Frequently, when nonmarital partners break up, the partners do 
not share the same understanding of what they had agreed to do, 
and the less sophisticated or the more trusting partner ends up with a 
much smaller share of the collective property than that party thought 
was his or her due. Certainly, it will be difficult to determine which, 
if either, of the parties correctly remembers the agreement if nothing 
was written down—the oral agreement may have been made long 
ago or may have been amended when the circumstances changed 
during the course of the relationship.146 Matters may be even less 
clear if the agreement is implied from the circumstances. Thus, there 
may be a variety of circumstances in which the content or, perhaps, 
even the existence of the contract cannot be established. 
Even if the plaintiff cannot establish that an oral contract existed 
or, perhaps, all of the terms of that contract, a separate question is 
how, if at all, the assets should be distributed when the relationship 
ends. As an Indiana appellate court suggested, failure to distribute 
the assets might “do more to discredit the legal system in the eyes of 
those who learn of the facts of the case than to strengthen the insti-
tution of marriage or the moral fiber of our society.”147 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Had Donnelly in fact understood and agreed to this distribution of property rec-
ommended by Shuraleff, the ALI proposal would have permitted the inequitable distribution. 
See supra note 71 (discussing contracts between nonmarital partners). 
 146. Compare Kozlowksi v. Kozlowski, where the court reasoned: 
Whether we designate the agreement reached by the parties in 1968 to be express, 
as we do here, or implied is of no legal consequence. The only difference is in the 
nature of the proof of the agreement. Parties entering this type of relationship usu-
ally do not record their understanding in specific legalese. Rather, as here, the terms 
of their agreement are to be found in their respective versions of the agreement, and 
their acts and conduct in the light of the subject matter and the surrounding cir-
cumstances. 
403 A.2d 902, 906 (N.J. 1979). 
 147. Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
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Given the possible difficulties involved in ascertaining the intents 
of the parties, states might adopt any one of a number of ways of 
handling the distribution of assets when a nonmarital relationship 
ends. They might: (1) refuse to effect a distribution even if the par-
ties had made an express agreement to do so,148 (2) require that the 
agreement be in writing,149 (3) enforce express but not implied con-
tracts,150 (4) enforce express and implied contracts but eschew equi-
table remedies like constructive trust or quantum meruit,151 (5) en-
force express and implied contracts and employ other equitable 
remedies,152 or (6) “distribute cohabitants’ property as they do in di-
vorce cases.”153 Arguably, the difficulty in ascertaining intent mili-
tates in favor of shifting the ownership presumptions, precisely be-
cause there is such potential for confusion and unfairness. It simply 
cannot be thought good public policy to reward individuals for fail-
ing to fulfill their promises or for misrepresenting to their partners 
how the assets are characterized.154 As the Arizona Supreme Court 
explained, “The rule of non-enforcement . . . favors the strongest, 
the most unscrupulous, the one better prepared to take advantage or  
 
 
 
 148. See supra notes 91–101 and accompanying text (discussing the Hewitt approach). 
 149. See supra note 98 (Minnesota statute requiring that agreement be in writing). 
 150. See Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (“[W]e are 
unwilling to extend equitable principles to the extent plaintiff would have us do so, since re-
covery based on principles of contracts implied in law essentially would resurrect the old com-
mon-law marriage doctrine which was specifically abolished by the Legislature.”). 
 151. See Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Mass. 1998) (Massachusetts does “not 
recognize common law marriage, do[es] not extend to unmarried couples the rights possessed 
by married couples who divorce, and reject[s] equitable remedies that might have the effect of 
dividing property between unmarried parties.”). 
 152. In Watts v. Watts, the court noted: 
Courts traditionally have settled contract and property disputes between unmarried 
persons, some of whom have cohabited. Nonmarital cohabitation does not render 
every agreement between the cohabiting parties illegal and does not automatically 
preclude one of the parties from seeking judicial relief, such as statutory or common 
law partition, damages for breach of express or implied contract, constructive trust 
and quantum meruit where the party alleges, and later proves, facts supporting the 
legal theory. The issue for the court in each case is whether the complaining party 
has set forth any legally cognizable claim. 
405 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Wis. 1987). 
 153. Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1267 
(1998); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY & THE NEW PROPERTY 281 (1981). 
 154. But see supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that the 
Hewitt court found convincing as a matter of policy for not enforcing such agreements). 
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the more cunning of the cohabitants . . . [which is not] equitable or 
good public policy.”155 
B. Shifting the Presumptions 
The ALI recommendation would handle a number of the cases 
discussed here rather well. When there is a meeting of the minds that 
the parties do not want the distribution of assets to follow the ALI 
recommendation, they can memorialize that intention in writing and 
thereby avoid the ALI default rules. Absent an express or implied 
agreement, however, the ALI asset distribution method would ap-
ply.156 The proposed system “shifts the burden of showing a contract 
to the party who wishes to avoid such fairness-based remedies, rather 
than putting it on the one who seeks to claim them.”157 
The ALI recommendation involves a compromise. Respecting 
the intent of the parties is viewed as important. However, given the 
difficulty in ascertaining the intent of the parties and the great poten-
tial for unfairness absent a shift in presumption, the ALI recommen-
dation is sensible and, arguably, one of the best approaches to a 
problem with no easy or straightforward solution. 
C. The Effect of Adopting the ALI Compromise 
The adoption of the ALI proposal might at first seem likely to 
induce some individuals to choose nonmarital cohabitation over 
marriage. Yet, on closer examination, the ALI recommendation can-
not plausibly be thought to be intended or likely to “encourage par-
ties to enter a nonmarital relationship as an alternative to mar-
riage.”158 Indeed, as the ALI suggests, “to the extent that some 
individuals avoid marriage in order to avoid responsibilities to a part-
ner, [the modification] . . . reduces the incentive to avoid marriage 
because it diminishes the effectiveness of the strategy.”159 Further, 
because “informal domestic relationships are not generally recog-
nized by third parties, including governments, which often make 
 
 155. Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 670 (Ariz. 1984). 
 156. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 (adoption of the 
Principles would put in place a “set of default rules that apply to domestic partners who do not 
provide explicitly for a different set of rules.”). 
 157. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b. 
 158. Id. § 6.02. 
 159. Id. 
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marriage advantageous under various regulatory and benefit 
schemes,”160 the state incentives to marry are still in place. Thus, in a 
relationship in which one of the partners has a stronger economic 
position than the other, the ALI recommendation makes marriage at 
least as attractive as non-marriage for both parties: the economically 
weaker party would derive benefits from third parties, for example, 
by becoming eligible to receive benefits from the state, and the eco-
nomically stronger party would have lost some of her ability to pro-
tect assets from the other party and thus would no longer have the 
same incentives not to marry. Just as would be true were they to 
have married, the parties would have to agree to opt out in order for 
the presumptions regarding ownership of assets to be changed.161 
In Western States Construction, Inc. v. Michoff,162 Justice Springer 
argued in dissent that “[p]ermitting community property to be cre-
ated by cohabitation or contract is a disincentive to marriage; it gives 
unmarried persons the rights of community property without impos-
ing upon them the mutual assumption of duties that is attendant to 
the marital status.”163 He was objecting to the state’s willingness to 
allow nonmarital cohabitants to contract to have their property 
treated as community property because unmarried persons would 
then “be in a position to choose whether or not they wish to be gov-
erned by community property law; whereas, community ownership is 
thrust upon married persons at the time of their marriage unless they 
agree in writing not to hold property as community.”164 He sug-
gested that by affording nonmarital cohabitants this option, “married 
couples will automatically be controlled by community property laws 
unless they decide to ‘opt out’; whereas unmarried couples will now 
have the odd privilege of being able to choose (impliedly or ex-
pressly, orally or in writing) whether they wish to hold property 
regularly or as ‘community property by analogy.’”165 Justice Springer 
worried that the difference in how the law treated marital versus 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. § 6.03 cmt. b (“As in marriage, in the ordinary case the law should provide 
remedies at the dissolution of a domestic relationship that will ensure an equitable allocation of 
accumulated property and of the financial losses arising from the termination of the relation-
ship.”); see also id. § 6.02 cmt. a (stating that couples may avoid the consequences of the ALI 
recommendations by an agreement to the contrary). 
 162. 840 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1992). 
 163. Id. at 1229 (Springer, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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nonmarital couples would induce some couples not to marry.166 
The ALI recommendation removes the difficulty highlighted by 
Justice Springer. Given that many states permit nonmarital couples 
to make contracts governing the disposition of property acquired 
during the relationship,167 adoption of the ALI recommendation 
would remove the advantage Justice Springer finds so objectionable 
since under the ALI recommendation both marital and nonmarital 
couples would have to opt out to avoid the imposition of marital or 
community property laws. Thus, one of the incentives in current law 
not to marry would be removed by adoption of the ALI recommen-
dation. 
V. THE POTENTIAL FOR CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION 
A different criticism of the ALI recommendation is that states 
adopting it will promote conceptual confusion regarding what 
counts as a marriage or a family. Yet, states already recognize non-
marital relationships without promoting confusion. Indeed, given 
the contradictory justifications which have been offered to explain 
why these relationships should not be recognized, the failure to rec-
ognize these relationships is what promotes the most confusion. 
A. Existing Practices 
The ALI recommendation is hardly as novel as might originally 
be thought. States already recognize the existence of nonmarital co-
habitant relationships and do not confuse such relationships with 
marriages. The wisdom of refusing to extend more benefits to those 
in nonmarital cohabitant relationships168 raises a separate question 
that will not be discussed here, but it is quite clear that the recogni-
tion of such relationships by the courts has not resulted in concep-
tual conflation or confusion. Indeed, even when nonmarital partners 
have received third-party benefits,169 they have received such benefits 
out of equity rather than because the court could not differentiate 
 
 166. See id. 
 167. See Leonard Wagner, Note, Recognizing Contract and Property Rights of Unmarried 
Cohabitants in Wisconsin: Watts v. Watts, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1097–1102 (discussing 
practices in different states). 
 168. Especially for same-sex couples, who do not have the option to marry. 
 169. See supra note 52 (discussing awarding state benefits to nonmarital partners). 
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between marital and nonmarital partners.170 
A related concern is that adoption of the ALI recommendation 
will somehow increase confusion about what constitutes a “family.” 
This concern is unfounded precisely because “family” is already a 
rather inclusive term.171 For example, definitions of family have been 
at issue in zoning cases, and individuals with no romantic or blood 
relationships whatsoever have been defined as family.172 Given the 
large variety of groups of individuals that have already been recog-
nized in this country as constituting families,173 including single-
parent households, blended families, adoptive families, families in-
volving same-sex partners and their children, and so forth,174 adop-
tion of the ALI recommendation will not change the understanding 
of the groups of individuals to which that term can refer. 
B. Prostitution and Gratuitous Services 
Historically, courts have seemed the most confused when at-
tempting to justify their refusal to recognize nonmarital relationships 
or their refusal to enforce agreements between nonmarital domestic 
partners. Courts sometimes refused to enforce such contracts be-
cause they viewed these contracts as cold-hearted agreements for 
payment for sexual services,175 sometimes because such relationships 
 
 170. Sometimes, nonmarital partners receive third-party benefits because of a specific leg-
islative enactment. Even in that situation, however, the courts and the legislature do not con-
fuse who is married and who is not. See, e.g., Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91, 98 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“[N]othing in the DPO [Chicago’s Domestic Partners Ordinance] pur-
ports to create a marital status or marriage as those terms are commonly defined. Rather, the 
DPO addresses only health benefits extended to City employees and those residing with 
them.”). 
 171. Cf. Katz, supra note 153, at 1253 (“[F]amily law is the study of the establishment, 
supervision, and termination or reorganization of family and family-like relationships like hus-
band and wife, parent and child, and unrelated persons living with each other in a committed 
relationship.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) 
(nuns); Robertson v. W. Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) (nurses); Bor-
ough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1990) (students); Missionaries of Our 
Lady of La Salette v. Vill. of Whitefish Bay, 66 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. 1954) (priests). 
 173. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (“The demographic changes of the 
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of fami-
lies varies greatly from household to household.”). 
 174. See Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving and 
Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 286 (1992/1993) (discussing various types of families). 
 175. Compare Glasgo v. Glasgo, where the court reasoned: 
We believe that it ill behooves courts to categorize either the Hewitts’ or the Glas-
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were viewed as involving love and a sense of duty and thus the ser-
vices were presumed to have been performed gratuitously without 
expectation of payment,176 and sometimes out of fear that the rela-
tionships would be viewed as indistinguishable from marriage if even 
only limited benefits were conferred.177 Recently, courts have re-
jected that the cases before them involve meretricious or gratuitous 
services and have upheld the distribution of the assets acquired dur-
ing the nonmarital relationship.178 
The point here should not be misunderstood. Insofar as an 
agreement is construed as financial support in exchange for sexual 
services, that agreement will be deemed void as against public policy 
and hence unenforceable. As the Supreme Court of California made 
 
gos’ relationships as “meretricious” or “illicit” in any sense of those terms. Such epi-
thets should be reserved for cases in which they are deserved. There are still situa-
tions to which such terms apply, but this case is not one of them. Here the specific 
facts which might give rise to a description of a meretricious relationship are con-
spicuously absent: the parties had been married formerly, they sought to rear their 
children in a family setting, they conducted themselves for a significant period of 
time as a conventional American family, the wife showed concern for her own and 
her children’s future economic security. All the parties failed to do to conform to 
societal norms of marital behavior was to complete the legal formalities. To apply 
the traditional rationale denying recovery to one party in cases where contracts are 
held to be void simply because illegal sexual relations are posited as consideration for 
the bargain is unfair, unjust, and unduly harsh. Such unnecessary results probably do 
more to discredit the legal system in the eyes of those who learn of the facts of the 
case than to strengthen the institution of marriage or the moral fiber of our society. 
To deny recovery to one party in such a relationship is in essence to unjustly enrich 
the other. 
410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
 176. See Roznowski v. Bozyk, 251 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (“Without proof 
of the expectations of the parties, the presumption of gratuity will overcome the usual contract 
implied by law to pay for what is accepted.”) (citing Weessies v. Van Dyke’s Estate, 123 N.W. 
608, 610 (Mich. 1909)). York v. Place also explains: 
[I]n the normal course of human affairs persons living together in a close relation-
ship perform services for each other without expectation of payment. Payment in the 
usual sense is not expected because the parties mutually care for each other’s needs. 
Also because services are performed out of a feeling of affection or a sense of obliga-
tion, not for payment. 
544 P.2d 572, 574 (Or. 1975). 
 177. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979) (“In our judgment the 
fault in the appellate court holding in this case is that its practical effect is the reinstatement of 
common law marriage.”). 
 178. Because these decisions did not involve third-party benefits, the courts have tended 
to reject the argument that the distribution would thereby make the relationship between 
nonmarital partners indistinguishable from marriage. 
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clear in Marvin v. Marvin,179 “a contract between nonmarital part-
ners is unenforceable only to the extent that it explicitly rests upon the 
immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services.”180 
Yet, a contract between cohabitants need not be for meretricious 
sexual services, even if the contract is “expressly made in contempla-
tion of a common living arrangement.”181 For example, even where 
one of the parties works exclusively inside the home while the other 
party works outside of the home,182 it would be inaccurate to claim 
that financial support was being offered solely for sexual services, 
since the individual working inside the home might perform a variety 
of tasks such as cooking, cleaning, and child-rearing that are quite 
distinct from the provision of sexual services183 and that a paid em-
ployee would have to perform if the partner in question were unwill-
ing or unable to do the work. Thus, the Marvin court suggests that 
“[a] promise to perform homemaking services is, of course, a lawful 
and adequate consideration for a contract—otherwise those engaged 
in domestic employment could not sue for their wages. . . .”184 
Agreements between cohabitants that are not based on the provi-
sion of sexual services have been upheld whether or not the partners 
 
 179. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 180. Id. at 112; see also Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998) (A contract 
between unmarried cohabitants “is subject to the rules of contract law and is valid even if ex-
pressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, except to the extent that sex-
ual services constitute the only, or dominant consideration for the agreement.”); Kinnison v. 
Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 1981) (“Only when it is shown that such an agreement 
has meretricious sexual services as its consideration will the court deny enforcement as being 
against public policy.”). 
 181. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114. 
 182. See, for example, Carlson v. Olson, where the court observed the nature of a non-
marital couple’s relationship: 
The appellant Oral Olson and the respondent Laura Carlson began to live together 
as husband and wife in October of 1955. At the time she was 22, and he was 31. 
They lived together for 21 years, raised a son to majority, and acquired a modest 
home and some personal property. They did not, however, ever legally marry, al-
though they held themselves out to neighbors, friends, relatives, and the public as 
husband and wife. During the relationship she did not work outside the home. 
256 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1977). 
 183. See Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923, 927 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) (“Paul received the 
cooking, cleaning and household chores he bargained for while Judy received monetary sup-
port. Together they were able to acquire property through their joint efforts. Clearly Judy’s 
homemaking services can be valued and constituted adequate consideration for the couple’s 
implied agreement.”). 
 184. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113 n.5 (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 152 P.2d 480, 484 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1954)). 
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were of the same sex.185 However, where courts find the services 
themselves to be meretricious, they have refused to enforce the 
agreements. Thus, for example, in Taylor v. Fields,186 the court held 
that the provisions of sexual services was “an inseparable part of the 
consideration for the agreement and render[ed] it unenforceable in 
its entirety.”187 
Courts should be commended for their willingness to enforce 
contracts that are not solely based on the provision of meretricious 
services. In many nonmarital cohabitation cases, the couple pooled 
financial assets or each partner contributed to the couple’s financial 
well-being by investing time, energy, and talents in a mutual business 
or undertaking.188 The agreement in these cases obviously involves 
 
 185. See Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984) (agreement between members of dif-
ferent-sex couple remanded to determine if partnership existed); Bramlett v. Selman, 597 
S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980) (agreement between members of same-sex couple upheld); Whorton v. 
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) (agreement between members of same-sex 
couple upheld); Silver v. Starrett, 674 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (agreement between 
members of same-sex couple upheld); Kinnison, 627 P.2d at 595 (agreement between mem-
bers of different-sex couple upheld); see also Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 
1995) (en banc) (“We hold income and property acquired during a meretricious relationship 
should be characterized in a similar manner as income and property acquired during mar-
riage.”). But see Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
members of same-sex couple cannot have meretricious relationship because they cannot 
marry), review granted 11 P.3d 825 (Wash. 2000). 
 186. 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 187. Id. at 193. A California appellate court reached a similar conclusion in Jones v. Daly, 
176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981) (Plaintiff’s acting as the decedent’s lover “form[ed] 
an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and render[ed] it unenforceable in 
its entirety.”). A separate question is whether the court was correct that sexual services were an 
inseparable part of the agreement. See, e.g., Kristin Bullock, Comment, Applying Marvin v. 
Marvin to Same-Sex Couples: A Proposal for a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract 
Statute, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1046 (1992) (criticizing the D. Canale & Co. court for 
“refus[ing] to sever any illegality conveyed by the terms ‘lover’ and ‘cohabiting mate’ from 
Randal’s promises to be James’s housekeeper and cook”). 
 188. Consider Whorton, where the court discussed other contributions to a nonmarital 
relationship: 
When the parties began living together in 1977, they orally agreed that Whorton’s 
exclusive, full-time occupation was to be Dillingham’s chauffeur, bodyguard, social 
and business secretary, partner and counselor in real estate investments, and to ap-
pear on his behalf when requested. Whorton was to render labor, skills, and personal 
services for the benefit of Dillingham’s business and investment endeavors. Addi-
tionally, Whorton was to be Dillingham’s constant companion, confidant, traveling 
and social companion, and lover, to terminate his schooling upon obtaining his As-
sociate in Arts degree, and to make no investment without first consulting Dilling-
ham. 
248 Cal. Rptr. at 406–07. 
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more than meretricious services. 
C. Another Weakness in the Contract Paradigm 
The contract paradigm in which these relationships are viewed as 
fee-for-service is problematic even where the court recognizes that 
the “service” is not simply sexual. The members of the partnership 
likely do not view their relationship in terms of an agreement for the 
provision of services in exchange for pay. For example, rather than 
envisioning one partner’s earning as tied to his or her cleaning the 
toilets or washing the dishes, the parties likely view their relationship 
as one in which each would help and support the other without that 
help and support being tied to the provision of particular services. 
Consider In re Estate of Alexander (Alexander v. Alexander)189 in 
which the Mississippi Supreme Court had to decide whether a 
woman who had lived with the decedent for thirty-three years190 was 
entitled to any benefits. Margie Alexander “sought an ‘equitable lien 
entitling her to full use and occupancy’ of the residence of Sam Alex-
ander, deceased, for as long as Margie live[d] or occupie[d] the 
property.”191 Although she and the deceased had lived together as if 
they were married,192 they had never in fact married because she was 
still married to someone else.193 She had never divorced because she 
had not known where her husband was and had thought that she 
could not divorce him without knowing his whereabouts.194 
The court noted “the lack of evidence that the deceased, Sam 
Alexander, knew of any expectation of Margie to be paid when he 
accepted her services . . . [and the lack] of evidence that he accepted 
her services under circumstances which indicate to a reasonable man 
that her services were offered with the expectation of compensa-
tion.”195 Because there had been no agreement or understanding 
that there would be payment for the services that had been provided 
for more than three decades, the court denied recovery, notwith-
 
 189. 445 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1984). 
 190. See id. at 837. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. at 842 (Lee, J., dissenting) (“[H]er understanding was that she could not get a 
divorce because she did not know the whereabouts of George.”). 
 195. Id. at 838. 
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standing the sympathetic nature of her claim.196 
In dissent, Justice Lee argued that requiring evidence of an 
agreement for payment was inappropriate, stating that “the assertion 
that there was no evidence that Margie expected to be paid for her 
services or that Sam expected to pay her . . . amount[s] to nothing 
more than a straw man set up for the purpose of knocking down 
without having to give a true assessment of the couple’s relation-
ship.”197 Indeed, Justice Lee argued that expectation of payment 
would have been entirely inappropriate198 since “Margie and Sam 
clearly considered themselves man and wife, sharing equally in both 
their assets and liabilities.”199 Thus, precisely because Sam and 
Margie had a domestic partnership rather than a business relation-
ship, use of the contract model had a great potential for yielding in-
equitable results. 
Various courts have suggested that it is simply inaccurate to infer 
that cohabitation itself establishes an express200 or implied201 agree-
ment to distribute the assets acquired during the relationship in a 
particular way.202 Yet, a separate question is whether the nonexis-
 
 196. See id. at 840 (“Margie’s claim naturally arouses our sympathy, but absent any evi-
dence of ‘an implied obligation or contract’ the record before us fails to establish any proper 
basis for relief to her.”). 
 197. Id. at 842 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
 198. See id. (“Of course there was no expectation of payment for services!”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Aehegma v. Aehegma, 797 P.2d 74, 79 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Boland v. 
Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 145 (Conn. 1987)) (“Cohabitation, no matter for how long, does 
not by itself prove the existence of an express agreement for post-cohabitation rehabilitative 
support or an equitable division of separate property acquired or improved during cohabita-
tion.”). 
 201. See id. (citing Boland, 521 A.2d at 145) (“Cohabitation, no matter for how long, 
does not by itself prove the existence of a contract implied-in-fact.”); see also Boland, 521 A.2d 
at 145 (“We agree with the trial referee that cohabitation alone does not create any contractual 
relationship or, unlike marriage, impose other legal duties upon the parties.”). 
 202. See Martin v. Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 757, 761–62 (Tenn. 2000) (rejecting distribu-
tion of retirement benefits to nonmarital cohabitant because “[i]n essence, we would be re-
quired to hold that unmarried couples may create an implied partnership simply by their con-
tinued cohabitation. We decline to do so.”). 
For contrary analysis, see W. States Const., Inc. v. Michoff, where the court stated: 
There is no evidence that the parties expressly agreed to hold their property as 
though they were married. The district court erred in so finding. Nevertheless, we 
conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that 
Lois and Max impliedly agreed to hold their property as though they were married. 
In addition to living together and holding themselves out to be a married couple, 
this evidence included the parties filing federal tax returns as husband and wife, the 
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tence of such an agreement should preclude the distribution of assets 
acquired during the relationship. As Justice Lee suggests and as some 
courts have recognized, use of the contract model may be inappro-
priate in many domestic partnership cases precisely because it implic-
itly misrepresents the character of the relationship. The relationship 
does not involve an agreement to pay for the provision of particular 
services but, instead, is a relationship of mutual support based on 
love and affection. By mischaracterizing the relationship as a contrac-
tual one for the provision of goods and services, a court may unfairly 
preclude distribution of the assets and instead allow one of the par-
ties to be unjustly enriched.203 
D. Property and Support 
One of the benefits of recognizing that these relationships are 
not simply fee-for-service agreements is conceptual since doing so 
more accurately reflects the nature of the relationship. Another bene-
fit is practical in that courts will be less reluctant to order support in 
certain kinds of deserving cases. The ALI proposal covers both the 
division of property and the imposition of support obligations, but 
doing the latter seems especially difficult to justify if one uses the fee-
for-service paradigm. 
According to the ALI proposal, “property claims and support 
obligations presumptively arise between persons who qualify as do-
mestic partners, as they do between legal spouses, without inquiry 
into each couple’s particular arrangements, except as the presump-
tion is itself overcome by contract.”204 The property claims of do-
mestic and marital partners are treated similarly in that, as a general 
 
parties designating that they held the Western States stock as community property in 
their Subchapter S election, and Max’s insistence that Lois sign a consent of spouse 
to effectuate a partnership he wanted to enter. 
840 P.2d 1220, 1224–25 (Nev. 1992). 
 203. The Lawlis court explains: 
Thus, the protestations of Thompson that there was no understanding or promise in 
respect to the moneys transferred to him is, under the theory of unjust enrichment, 
irrelevant. Thompson asserts that only by agreement can there be a duty to make 
restitution where the parties are cohabiting in a nonmarital relationship. As the 
above decisions demonstrate, the making of an agreement is a concept entirely for-
eign to the quasi-contract concept of unjust enrichment and restitution. No agree-
ment is needed. 
Lawlis v. Thompson, 405 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Wis. 1987). 
 204. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b. 
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matter, “property is domestic-partnership property if it would be mari-
tal property . . . had the domestic partners been married to one an-
other during the domestic partnership period.”205 While there is an ex-
ception to this provision,206 the recommendation basically subjects 
property acquired during a domestic partnership to potential distri-
bution in those circumstances in which property acquired during a 
marriage would be so distributed. This part of the proposal reflects 
the current practice of some states.207 
The ALI recommendation regarding the treatment of property 
will likely meet less resistance than its recommendation regarding the 
treatment of support obligations since courts have manifested an 
unwillingness to order alimony for a nonmarital cohabitant absent 
explicit legislative authorization.208 The Mississippi Supreme Court 
explained in Chrismond v. Chrismond 209 that “permanent alimony 
can only be allowed where the relation of husband and wife has ex-
isted, but this rule does not preclude an equitable division of prop-
erty where there is a judicial separation of the parties on account of 
the invalidity of the marriage contract.”210 Thus, courts might be less 
open to ordering support than to distributing property when non-
marital partners separate, although some courts, including the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court, have found that requiring periodic payments 
not classified as alimony to former nonmarital partners is permissible 
under certain circumstances.211 
 
 205. Id. § 6.04(1). 
 206. See id. § 6.04(3) (“Property that would be recharacterized as marital property under 
§ 4.18 if the parties had been married, is not domestic-partnership property.”). 
Compare Connell v. Francisco, where the court held: 
Therefore, property owned by one of the parties prior to the meretricious relation-
ship and property acquired during the meretricious relationship by gift, bequest, de-
vise, or descent with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is not before the court for 
division. All other property acquired during the relationship would be presumed to 
be owned by both of the parties. 
898 P.2d 831, 836–37 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). 
 207. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 836 (“We hold income and property acquired during a 
meretricious relationship should be characterized in a similar manner as income and property 
acquired during marriage. Therefore, all property acquired during a meretricious relationship is 
presumed to be owned by both parties. This presumption can be rebutted.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 873 (Miss. 1986) (“Because we afford 
common law marriages no recognition, there is in our law no authority to award alimony in 
any such [nonmarital] setting.”). 
 209. 52 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1951). 
 210. Id. at 629 (citing Fuller v. Fuller, 7 P. 241 (Kan. 1885)). 
 211. In Taylor v. Taylor, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld an award of $75 per 
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Ironically, the refusal to impose support payments may result 
from an inaccurate construction of legislative intent. Presumably, 
when a legislature suggests that a court may order alimony for mari-
tal spouses, the legislature is not suggesting that a contract in which 
one nonmarital party promises to make periodic payments to another 
party would be void because it violates public policy. Rather, the leg-
islature is more plausibly interpreted to be taking one of two ap-
proaches. Either the legislature simply is not taking a position on the 
appropriateness of ordering such support when nonmarital partners 
separate, or the legislature feels that ordering support is inappropri-
ate absent some previous agreement to that effect. 
Consider Crowe v. DeGioia,212 in which the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant had promised her that “he would take care of her and 
support her for the rest of her life, and that he would share with her 
his various assets.”213 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to alimony214 because “the power of a court 
to award alimony is purely statutory, and alimony may be awarded 
only in a matrimonial action for divorce or nullity,”215 but the plain-
tiff was nonetheless entitled to support.216 A contractual agreement 
to support someone for his or her entire life,217 even when enforced, 
 
month for thirty-six months as support, as distinguished from alimony. See 17 So. 2d 422, 422 
(Miss. 1975); see also id. at 422–23 (affirming previous holding that there is no foundation for 
alimony without a valid marriage). 
 212. 447 A.2d 173 (N.J. 1982). 
 213. Id. at 175. 
In Thomas v. LaRosa, the nonmarital partners divided the family responsibilities in a 
similar way: 
According to the complaint, in August, 1980, the parties became acquainted while 
both were living in Clarksburg, West Virginia. Thereafter, during the Spring of 
1981, appellant and appellee agreed that they would hold themselves out and act as 
husband and wife. It was further agreed that appellant would perform valuable ser-
vices for appellee, including being his companion, housekeeper, confidante and 
business helper. In consideration of the valuable services and obligations undertaken 
and performed by appellant, appellee promised and agreed to provide financial secu-
rity for appellant for her lifetime and to educate appellant’s children. Appellee car-
ried out such agreement for approximately eight years, but now has breached and 
reneged. 
400 S.E.2d 809, 810 (W. Va. 1990). 
 214. See Crowe, 447 A.2d at 176. 
 215. Id. (citing O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 96 A.2d 410 (N.J. 1953)). 
 216. See id. at 178. 
 217. The Whorton court explained: 
In consideration of Whorton’s promises, Dillingham was to give him a one-half eq-
uity interest in all real estate acquired in their joint names, and in all property there-
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is not alimony and thus should not be exclusively for marital part-
ners. 
Basic contract law justifies a court’s ordering support payments 
where one of the nonmarital partners had explicitly promised the 
other that those payments would be made.218 The ALI recommenda-
 
after acquired by Dillingham. Dillingham agreed to financially support Whorton for 
life, and to open bank accounts, maintain a positive balance in those accounts, grant 
Whorton invasionary powers to savings accounts held in Dillingham’s name, and 
permit Whorton to charge on Dillingham’s personal accounts. Dillingham was also 
to engage in a homosexual relationship with Whorton. Importantly, for the purpose 
of our analysis, the parties specifically agreed that any portion of the agreement 
found to be legally unenforceable was severable and the balance of the provisions 
would remain in full force and effect. 
Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 218. There is some question as to whether the statute of frauds applies in these kinds of 
situations. In some states, an agreement to take care of another individual for the rest of his or 
her life will not be enforceable unless reduced to a writing. For example, the Alaskan statute 
provides: 
In the following cases and under the following conditions an agreement, promise, or 
undertaking is unenforceable unless it or some note or memorandum of it is in writ-
ing and subscribed by the party charged or by an agent of that party: 
(1) an agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the 
making of it; 
(2) an agreement the performance of which is not to be completed by the end of a 
lifetime . . . . 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010 (Michie 2000); see also Laboulais v. Cohade, 236 N.Y.S.2d 166, 
167 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (“plaintiff alleges . . . that defendants agreed to provide a home and to 
furnish care for plaintiff for the rest of his life and to tend him in his old age.”); id. at 168 
(“Since performance of the oral contract was not to be completed before the end of a lifetime, 
it was void under the Statute of Frauds.”). However, exceptions to the completed-before-the-
end-of-a-lifetime rule exist. The Alaska statute further provides: 
A contract, promise, or agreement that is subject to [ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010], 
that does not satisfy the requirements of that section, but that is otherwise valid is 
enforceable if 
(1) there has been full performance on one side accepted by the other in accordance 
with the contract; . . . 
(4) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits, voluntarily or involuntar-
ily, in pleadings or at any other stage of this or any other action or proceeding the 
making of an agreement. 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020 (Michie 2000). See also Hall v. Hall, where the court stated: 
Exceptions “taking the case out of the statute” have traditionally been recognized as 
to all statute of frauds provisions. Thus, a substantial change of position in reliance 
on an oral agreement will estop reliance on the statute (1 Witkin, Summary of Cali-
fornia Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 325, pp. 305–06), and an actual transfer of 
realty constituting partial performance of the oral agreement will satisfy the proof 
element otherwise reflected in the requirement of a writing. (Id. at §§ 318–19, pp. 
299–301.) 
271 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (Ct. App. 1990); Brown v. Phillips, 330 So. 2d 510, 512 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1976) (“Lastly, we point out that appellees have raised the statute of frauds as a basis 
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tion goes farther than that, however. The ALI is recommending that 
domestic partners receive support in some cases in which either (1) 
partner support might be inferred to have been part of the bargain, 
or (2) periodic payments might be a distribution of property rather 
than an award of spousal support.  
A few points are in order about this recommendation. First, 
adoption of the ALI proposal might induce some to marry who oth-
erwise would not. For example, some people might refuse to marry 
because they thought that in the event of a break-up they would be 
less likely to be ordered to pay support were they merely to have 
lived with their partners than if they had married them. By removing 
this incentive not to marry, the ALI support proposal may in fact 
promote marriage. 
Second, a court might adopt the ALI recommendation with re-
spect to the distribution of property but wait for the legislature to 
authorize the court’s ordering support for a nonmarital partner.219 
The court might justify this position by suggesting that because the 
power to award partner or spousal support is purely statutory,220 this 
matter is particularly appropriate to be left to the state legislature.221  
Third, precisely because a court’s refusal to order support until 
authorized by the legislature to do so might produce inequitable re-
sults and might, as a public policy matter, provide a disincentive to 
marry, courts might decide not to wait for the legislature to act. The 
courts might instead decide to order distributions of property and 
nonmarital partner support as well, reasoning that the legislature’s 
failure to address the provision did not amount to a legislative prohi-
 
for affirmance. The performance on the part of appellant by execution of the deed takes this 
transaction out of the statute of frauds.”). Of course, in some states, such oral agreements will 
not be subject to the statute of frauds as long as they could be completed within a year. See, 
e.g., Young v. Ward, 917 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (“[A]greements to last dur-
ing the lifetime of one of the parties would also not require a writing because the party upon 
whose life the duration of the contract is measured could die within a year of the agreement’s 
making.”); Cannon v. Harris, 166 P.2d 998, 999 (Kan. 1946) (“[T]he parol agreement 
whereby Robinson agreed to permit Mrs. Cannon to occupy the real estate as long as she lived 
was capable of being fully performed within one year and was not in violation of the statute of 
frauds.”). 
 219. See Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931, 932 (Miss. 1994) (“[T]he endorsement of any 
form of ‘palimony’ is a task for the legislature and not this court . . . .”). 
 220. See Crowe v. DeGioia, 447 A.2d 173, 176 (N.J. 1982) (citing O’Loughlin v. 
O’Loughlin, 96 A.2d 410 (N.J. 1953)) (“The power of a court to award alimony is purely 
statutory, and alimony may be awarded only in a matrimonial action for divorce or nullity.”). 
 221. See Davis, 643 So. 2d at 932. 
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bition of support orders for nonmarital partners but merely a legisla-
tive decision not to express a view with respect to the appropriate-
ness of such orders. 
E. Adulterous Relationships 
The ALI recommendation that the domestic partnership rela-
tionship be recognized even if one of the parties is married will likely 
arouse controversy. In Thomas v. LaRosa,222 the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia refused to enforce an agreement between 
domestic partners for future support,223 notwithstanding the court’s 
having enforced an agreement between domestic partners earlier that 
same year.224 The court suggested that the cases were easily distin-
guishable because in this case, unlike the other, one of the parties 
was already married.225 The court seemed to have two worries in 
mind: (1) the rights of the innocent spouse might be affected,226 and 
(2) the enforcement of “such a contract when one party is already 
married would amount to the condonation of bigamy . . . .”227 
Neither worry should prevent adoption of the ALI recommenda-
 
 222. 400 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1990). 
 223. See id. at 815. 
 224. See id. at 811. 
 225. See id. at 811–12. Justice Miller concurred by reasoning: 
I concur in the result reached by the majority that Mr. LaRosa is not subject to the 
financial claims of Karen J. Thomas because Mr. LaRosa is a married person. . . . 
Were Mr. LaRosa not married, I believe the certified question would be answered in 
the affirmative. Ms. Thomas’s suit would survive the motion to dismiss and the 
question would then be the proof of the agreement and whether there was in fact an 
independent basis for the contractual considerations that were not meretricious. 
Id. at 815. 
 226. See id. at 814 (“Although it is alleged that Mr. LaRosa is a man of immense wealth, 
continuing obligations of support to a woman who is essentially a second wife must, ipso facto, 
prejudice the rights of a lawful wife and her legitimate children.”); see also id. at 812 (noting 
that in the previous case, Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990), the court had cau-
tioned that “if either the man or woman is validly married to another person during the period 
of cohabitation, the property rights of the spouse and support rights of the children of such 
man or woman shall not in any way be adversely affected by such division of property.”). 
 227. Id. at 814. But see Donovan v. Scuderi, where the court observed: 
Whether an agreement is reached as the result of ego, braggadocio, love, kindness or 
affection does not affect the validity of a contract. Nor is it unenforceable because 
the contract may never have been struck, ‘but for’ the relationship, even if proven 
adulterous. That relationship does not disable parties from making an enforceable 
contract with each other so long as it does not stand or fall upon the sexual relation-
ship. 
443 A.2d 121, 127 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). 
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tion. The first is specifically addressed by the recommendation it-
self,228 since the ALI has made clear that the innocent spouse’s prop-
erty rights will take priority over the claims of the domestic partner. 
The second worry is simply unfounded. The ALI neither condones 
nor promotes bigamy or adultery229 (and states criminalizing such 
conduct might still prosecute the parties). However, the ALI does 
recognize that the failure to permit a domestic partner to recover 
even after an adulterous relationship may do nothing to protect mar-
riage230 and may only result in “excessively harsh” consequences. 231 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ALI recommendation is intended to promote equity and, 
secondarily, to save the states’ money. Adoption of the recommenda-
tion would neither destroy marriage nor revive common law mar-
riage. In fact, courts that have distributed property acquired during 
domestic partnerships have made quite clear that their jurisdictions 
did not recognize common law marriage232 and that they were not 
interested in converting their jurisdictions to “common law marriage 
 
 228. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. c (“The rule of 
Paragraph (5) defers fully to the claims of a spouse, but allows claims of a domestic partner to 
the extent that they would not displace those of a spouse.”). 
 229. See Collins v. Davis, 315 S.E.2d 759, 762–63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (Braswell, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that individual in adulterous relationship should not be permitted to 
use the courts to enforce agreement with her partner when she knew that her partner was mar-
ried to someone else). 
 230. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. d (discuss-
ing the individual who marries in good faith, later learns that the partner is already married to 
someone else, but at that point is not in a position to leave the putative marriage). 
 231. Id. § 6.01 cmt. d. 
 232. See, e.g., Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1986) (“We begin with the 
undisputed: that the legal relationship of husband and wife may be created only in conformity 
with the procedures authorized by the statute law of this state. Cohabitation which had not 
ripened into a common law marriage prior to April 5, 1956, is wholly ineffective to vest marital 
rights in either party thereto.”); Joan S. v. John S., 427 A.2d 498, 499 (N.H. 1981) (“New 
Hampshire is a jurisdiction which does not recognize the validity of common law marriages . . . 
except to the limited extent provided by [statute].” (citation omitted)); Martin v. Coleman, 19 
S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tenn. 2000) (“In Tennessee, marriage is controlled by statute, and com-
mon-law marriages are not recognized.” (citing Crawford v. Crawford, 277 S.W.2d 389, 391 
(Tenn. 1955)); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 435 (W. Va. 1990) (“Accordingly, we hold 
that pursuant to the statutory requirements . . . every marriage in this state must be solemnized 
under a license. Therefore, the validity of a common-law marriage is not recognized.”); Kinni-
son v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 1981) (“Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine 
of common-law marriage.”). 
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state[s] by the back door.”233 While eschewing the reintroduction of 
common law marriage, however, courts and the ALI have also rec-
ognized that the failure to distribute property acquired during a do-
mestic partnership may produce great unfairness. In many cases, 
“[t]o deny recovery to one party in such a relationship is in essence 
to unjustly enrich the other.”234 
The ALI recommendation is not without fault. For example, 
fairness and equity would be promoted even more were the ALI to 
recommend that third parties accord benefits to domestic partners. 
The gains in fairness and equity would more than offset the diminu-
tion in the material differences between marital and nonmarital rela-
tionships, and the symbolic differences between the two types of re-
lationships would still distinguish the relationships in the eyes of the 
public. In addition, many of the societal interests promoted by 
granting benefits to marital partners would also be promoted by 
granting them to domestic partners, especially to same-sex partners 
who cannot enter into a marriage-like relationship in any state but 
Vermont. Another difficulty is that the ALI goes too far when not 
allowing the intentions of the parties to prevail in certain circum-
stances. Where it was clear, for example, that the parties had orally 
agreed to opt out of the system recommended by the ALI, it would 
make sense to permit their wishes to prevail, lack of writing notwith-
standing.235 Finally, the ALI has failed to specify how the assets of a 
domestic partnership should be distributed when one of the parties 
in such a relationship dies. The ALI should recommend that the 
analogous protections be in place when such relationships end due to 
the death of one or both of the parties, since fairness and equity 
should be promoted under these circumstances as well. Nonetheless, 
because adoption of the recommendation will not destroy marriage 
or the family, will produce more equitable results in many cases, and 
will help prevent some of the horror stories that might otherwise oc-
cur, its adoption would have many advantages and deserves serious 
consideration. 
 
 233. Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 769 (Or. Ct. App. 1991). 
 234. Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
 235. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 7.05(1) (“An agreement is 
not enforceable if it is not set forth in a writing signed by both parties.”). 
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